The Appellate Brief by Rutledge, Wiley
Denver Law Review 
Volume 19 Issue 5 Article 2 
July 2021 
The Appellate Brief 
Wiley Rutledge 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr 
Recommended Citation 
Wiley Rutledge, The Appellate Brief, 19 Dicta 109 (1942). 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more 
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu. 
The Appellate Brief
BY WILEY RUTLEDGE*
My job as a judge is to read briefs and to write opinions. Yours as
lawyers, in part, is to write briefs and read opinions. We therefore
approach briefs, and perhaps also opinions, from different viewpoints
and with different attitudes,. You are committed to advance to one side.
We, presumably, are impartial and disinterested. Your job is to make
your brief, and through it your case on appeal, more convincing than
the other fellow's. Ours is to stand between you. And by that I do not
mean merely "to try the record and the briefs." It is, rather, regardless
of the respective merits of the briefs, to find the truth and right of the
case so far as not only they, but the record and the law, permit. For
after all, it is not the lawyers, but the clients, whose interests we try.
And for that reason we must be on guard lest a too excellent presentation
blind our eyes to the merit of a cause poorly or less ably presented on the
other side. We read the brief, therefore, and particularly at first, not
with suspicion, but rather always with a question. These differences in
approach have important consequences for the preparation of the brief,
as well as for its consideration. Some will be noted as we proceed.
ORAL ARGUMINT
There is a clear difference between the function of the oral argu-
ment and that of the briefs. Lawyers, and clients, place much emphasis.
and properly, on the former. The function of the oral prtsentation is
controlled by two factors. One is its brevity: The other is the prepara-
tion with which the judge comes to it. That is determined, of course, by
whether he has read the briefs, or them and the record, before the argu-
ment. If he has not done so, and unless the case is very simple, the argu-
ment can perform generally two functions.
One is to give the judge a bird's-eye view of the important facts.
In this there is frequent failure. Often the argument becomes so clouded
in a hodgepodge of basic facts and intricate factual detail, much of it
irrelevant, that the judge who has not previously dug out the essential
ones, can't see the forest for the trees, the bushes, and the trailing arbutus.
For him, this kind of argument is a total loss.
The other function, closely related to the first, is to bring out clearly
the controlling issues in the case. This, in my judgment, is more than
half the battle. But often it, too, is lost at the argument because the
lawyer brings so many points to the court's attention. The result is he
*Associate Justice, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia,
and formerly of the Boulder bar. This address was delivered before the Bar Association
of the District of Columbia and is reprinted by permission.
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gets it for none. And occasionally the argument serves rather to confuse
than to clarify the issues, not merely because of their number, but because
the lawyer has not thought his case through to the real questions in-
volved. If he had done so, there would not be so many. If the attorney
succeeds in getting to the court a clear picture of the essential facts and in
drawing out the real issues, his argument is a success. That is true
whether he wins or loses. Occasionally he will be able to add to this
something beyond casual reference to the authorities. In simple cases he
can do even more, and give full discussion of those cases which are in
point or very closely approximate. But in the main, not much can be
done, especially by appellant's attorney, toward thorough discussion of
previous decisions. In that situation, therefore, the time which remains
after stating the facts and elucidating the issues is better devoted to dis-
cussion of them on controlling principles, with reliance on the brief for
detailed substantiation.
An entirely different type of argument could be had, even in the
short time allowed, if all the judges should come to the hearing thor-
oughly prepared on the facts and the law by previous reading of the
record and briefs, and study of the issues and authorities. Then the
statement of the facts could be omitted or highly skeletonized. The
greater portion of time, on both sides, could be given to analysis of
issues, discussion on principle, and argument from authority. In some
instances the court might itself indicate which of the issues it regarded
as controlling or doubtful, and thus secure emphasis where most needed.
Such an argument would be something more than the "bird's-eye" type,
as to both facts and law. It would place appellant and appellee at more
equal advantage. Some might object that it would cause the court to
come to the argument with prejudgment or predisposition, but in any
event there would be opportunity for correction. And it is doubtful
whether this effect would be more pronounced than under the "bird's-
eye" type.
But presumably the latter is the more prevalent, and therefore the
one for which, in general, preparation must be made. And this has some
consequences for the brief.
RECORD
The proper purpose of an appeal is to secure a decision "whether
or not one or the other of the parties has been ill used under the law.",
This should be modified to say "so ill used under the law that the judg-
ment should be reversed." For not every error is prejudicial or sufficiently
so to require reversal. The purpose of the record on appeal is to tell the
'Stone, The Scope of Review and Record on Appeal, at page 4, found in JUDI-
CIAL ADMINISTRATION MONOGRAPHS, Series A, No. 16, prepared under the
Auspices of The Special Committee on Improving the Administration of Justice of The
American Bar Association.
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appellate court what happened at the trial and other previous stages of
the litigation. It is to present "an authenticated story of the action and
trial between Joe Doe and Richard Roe from their coming into court
until their appeal to the higher court.' '2 But, except rarely, it need not
tell everything. It should tell enough, and seldom more than enough, to
bring before the appellate tribunal a general view of the case as back-
ground or setting for the issues and a clear comprehension of the facts or
incidents with respect to which it is claimed prejudicial error was made.
With the practice, recently adopted here and previously in the Third and
Fourth Circuits, concerning printing of the record,, much of the formerly
existing difficulty in this respect has disappeared. The appendices, to-
gether with the statements of fact in the briefs, generally give an adequate
picture to the previous phases of the litigation. The bar has cooperated
splendidly in this. Some have gone farther by submitting cases upon
agreed statements of fact. These greatly relieve the burden of the court.
I trust the day has passed when, as was true with at least one case heard
before the new rule took effect, the judges had to wade through ten thick
volumes of printed record and index, most of which set out the rambling
kind of testimony which has become admissible in some administrative
proceedings. This is not intended to imply that I think the technical
rules for admission of evidence in court should apply to such cases. Quite
the contrary. Some of the rules for exclusion are still too rigid for use
even in court. And as to others, there are valid reasons for excluding
certain types of evidence from use by juries which have no sensible appli-
cation when facts are determined by experts, many of whom are lawyers.
In other words, equity long anticipated the wider opening of the doors
of proof which has become characteristic of the administrative tribunal,
and the reasons are substantially identical in both cases. But when, on
appeal, the attorneys throw the whole mass of administrative evidence at
the reviewing court, without regard to the relative importance of differ-
ent parts in relation to issues having real possibility of prejudice and with
no effort at condensation or elimination, the court, to speak mildly, has
some cause for complaint. It is part of the lawyer's job, if he wants real
and favorable consideration for this case, and his client's, to have not
only consideration, but some mercy, for the court. When he designates
and prints such a mass of irrelevant material he is simply loading or
unloading on the court's shoulders a job he is too lazy, too busy, or too
lacking in perspective to do. Yes, we do read the record-and the briefs.
"Ibid.
'Rule 17 of the General Rules of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia provides in part: "Unless ordered by this court, it shall not be
necessary to print the record on appeal or on petition for review of or enforcement of
an order, except that appellant shall print as a part of the appendix to his brief the
pertinent pleadings and pertinent docket entries, the judgment or order appealed from
or sought to be reviewed or enforced, together with any findings of fact. conclusions of
law and opinion or charge of the court, board or commission."
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But occasionally we do it muttering through our teeth things we could
not say aloud in Sunday School. This, however, is the rarer case. If it
still exists, it is more perhaps in relation to appeals from administrative
determinations than in regard to judicial proceedings, with the possible
exception of some patent cases. I.n the latter there appears to be still a
tendency, not only to set out the testimony in full, but to clutter the rec-
ord with references and exhibits without any effort at elimination of
irrelevant parts, particularly of applications. So much by way of what
I hope may be called a "parting shot" at a practice which is disappearing.
This criticism must be guarded. It is better to overload the record
than to leave out something vital. And at times that occurs. The lawyer,
if he must err in this respect, should do so on the side of his client, rather
than that of relieving the court. But this is a different thing from throw-
ing in everything on the chance the court itself may fish out something
the lawyer may miss. It is this shotgun practice toward which the criti-
cism is aimed.
BRIEF
And now for the brief. What is it supposed to do, how should it
do it, and what should it not do? There are both "do's" and "don'ts."
The term "brief" arises, perhaps, from the English practice in
which it refers to the statement or summary given by the attorney or
solicitor to the barrister for the latter's use in the trial of the cause.
Hence, the barrister is "briefed." But obviously it has acquired a different
meaning and function in our practice. We are not discussing trial briefs.
Laying aside the formal requirements of the rules, the brief has sev-
eral functions. Its basic one is to get to the court your picture of the
facts, analysis of the issues, and application of the law. If it does this,
you win. I should like to consider each of these phases separately to
some extent, and at the outset with reference to the "do's."
The Facts
First, then, your picture of the facts. The case is greatly simplified
for all when the facts, or the essential ones, are not disputed. The agreed
statement is appropriate for this situation. There are also many cases in
which factual difference is limited to a few things-the bulk of the evi-
dence is not controversial. In such cases, an agreed statement, so far as it
can go, likewise is helpful. I suspect it would be as much so to the law-
yers as to the courts, if in every case they should approach the appeal in
the spirit of the question, "How much can we agree upon?" rather than
"How much can we fight about?"
But when the facts are highly and generally in dispute, whether
because of conflicting evidence or because of conflicting inferences and in-
terpretations, the factual function of the brief becomes important. It is
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so in any case where there is not either formally or substantially an agreed
statement. This, in several respects.
In the first place, the appellant's attorney (or appellee's, if neces-
sary) can set forth a connected statement of the essential facts. Here the
brief can perform a "bird's-eye" function. And it is a valuable one,
especially when the record or appendix is long and complicated. Since
the more detailed facts appear of record, the brief-writer does not fear
that by failing to mention those he regards as immaterial or subordinate
he will prejudice his client's cause. So he can freely and truly summarize.
And this often, and especially when well done, may be 'the most help-
ful, if not also the most important part of the brief. It cuts the brush
away from the forest. It lifts the judge's vision over the foothills to
the mountains. It enables him to read the record with an eye to the
things which are important, in other words, intelligently, in true per-
spective.
Secondly, this phase of the brief gives opportunity for placing
emphasis-that is, where you think it should be. What are not the
facts in bird's-eye view, but the most important facts? What are the
Long's Peaks as distinguished from the Bear Mountains and the Flag-
staff Mountains? Here perhaps I should ask what are the Great Smokies
or the Alleghenies and what the Blue Ridge?
Again, what are the true facts? The jury and the trial tribunal
have the major function here. But there are times when appellate
tribunals must exercise some judgment on this. Perhaps it is most
important in the matter of inferences and interpretation. How are
proven facts to be regarded? What other facts may be drawn, per-
missibly or rightly, from them?
Finally, and this is related to all the foregoing, what color shall
be given to the facts? There are times when color, which is more than
emphasis, more than the bare fact in proof itself, gives meaning con-
cealed or dimmed without it. In what light is this or that fact to be
regarded? How is it affected by this or that other one or by the general
complex? The brief gives the legal painter his chance, but it is a
dangerous one if he attempts to apply color which is not on the palette
of the case. To change the figure, it can be a boomerang.
One thing more. The brief, as Justice Brandeis showed, is the
instrument for bringing to the court's attention and knowledge facts
not of record, but of which it may take judicial notice. You have no
idea how vastly ignorant judges may be of facts they know judicially.
There is a wide difference between judicial knowledge and actual knowl-
edge. And in some, perhaps only a few, cases these are the crucial
facts. I hope this will not bring down in our laps a deluge of Brandeis
briefs. But there should be more of them, and they need not all be
long ones.
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Mechanically, I have only one suggestion in respect to the factual
portion of the brief, and that is for accurate reference to the appendix
(or record) for every statement of fact. It is worth that if it is worth
making. And it is a great time saver for us.
The Analysis of the Issues
I turn now to analysis of the issues. On this it is hard to generalize.
But I regard it as next in importance to stating the facts accurately,
sufficiently and succinctly. If the real issues are not drawn out, or this
is done only confusedly, the remainder of the brief becomes almost a
total loss, except for the possibility that some case or other authority
may be cited accidentally which gives light on them.
I do not know how to tell you how to analyze. Quite possibly
I cannot do it myself. Certainly I am no master of it. But I think I
can recognize true analysis when I see it and its absence when I don't.
In a large percentage of our briefs we have excellent analysis. But there
are still too many in which it is only half or two-thirds done. There
are a very few in which it amounts to less than that.
Two dangers may be selected for comment. . First, overanalysis.
When I find a brief which sets up from twelve to twenty or thirty issues
or "points" or "assignments of error," I begin to look for the two or
three, perhaps the one, controlling issue or issues. Somebody has got
lost in the underbrush and I've got to get him--or the other fellow-
out.
In one case the basic question was whether the court had juris-
diction of the cause in the fundamental sense. The issue was raised in
such form that if jurisdiction were lacking, all of the proceedings, in-
cluding numerous orders entered over a period of several years in the suit
and in collateral proceedings in other jurisdictions would have been
"null and void." The determination of this issue controlled practical-
ly everything in the case. But one could not tell this from the brief
of the attacking party. When I first read it the impression was that
the trial court was not only filled, but saturated, with error. There
were apparently a score of major issues, as to each of which egregious
error had been made. They affected the service of process, the appearance
of the opposing attorneys and their authority to appear, the authority
of agents to act for principals, the validity of dozens of transactions,
orders, etc., etc. To read that assignment made one feel that error,
whole error, and nothing but error had been committed, so help you
the appellant. Moreover, each error appeared to be separate and distinct
from the others, an independent ground for relief unrelated to any-
thing else in the case. I went to work on the mountain, wondering
how the trial court could have managed to pile up error so variously
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and universally. The law of averages gave every indication of having
been exploded. It turned out that all the errors came down to one-
did the court have jurisdiction to do what it had done? It did.
That kind of brief I would label the "obfuscating" type and, if
you know judges, it is distinctly not the kind to use if you wish calm,
temperate, dispassionate reason to emanate from the cloister. If ob-
fuscation was not intended, the only other explanation is that the at-
torney did not know the difference between a legal result and its conse-
quences. Each of his "errors" was merely another, but well-disguised,
way to state a particular consequence of the view that the court was
wanting in jurisdiction.
I strongly advise against use of the obfuscating type of brief,
consciously or unconsciously. Though I have called this overanalysis,
it really is a type of underanalysis.
In the second place, a fairly commonly incurred danger is that of
concentrating so fully and completely on your own picture of the
facts and issues that you miss the big one or can't see the merit of the
other fellow's. Occasionally this is done by the lawyers on both sides.
The result is an argument in hiatus, and the gap may be the hole where
the big issue is hiding.
Perhaps I can illustrate the point with a recent case. A and B
were arrested for robbery. They were tried and convicted on evidence
which included confessions made out of court, identifications by the
victim, etc. But at the trial it was proved, over objection, that the
defendants had "pleaded guilty" at the preliminary hearing. Then
they had no counsel, nor were they warned they might have counsel or
that they. not speak or, if they should do so, their statements might
be used against them. Later, at arraignment, the courts' assigned
counsel, not guilty was pleaded and full defense on the merits was
made. The appeal was taken in forma pauperis. The only question
on appeal was whether the plea of guilty made at the preliminary hear-
ing was properly admitted in evidence at the trial.
The prosecution asserted that admissibility was controlled by the
law of voluntary or extrajudicial confessions. The defense claimed
violation of the right of counsel and of the privilege against self-
incrimination. On the prosecution's theory, there was no compulsion
sufficient to destroy the probative value of the plea, regarded as a con-
fession of guilt. On the theory of the defens<e, a serious question arose
whether the privilege had been violated. There was no controlling
authority. But analogies from Supreme Court decisions were close, on
both sides, and conflicting. The government relied heavily on cases
holding that statements not amounting to a confession or admission
of guilt, made under circumstances similar to those existing when the
plea was made, were admissible. The defense relied on a decision ex-
cluding a plea of guilty made at arraignment. Our case stood exactly
between the two lines of Supreme Court decisions. Both analogies were
close. In the absence of the other, each probably would have ruled our
decision. But there they stood thumbing noses at each other-and
with our case in between.
The point in regard to the briefs is this: Each brief was admirable
-on its theory. Each cited pertinent authorities, perhaps all of them.
Each drew its analogies closely. Each was a lawyer's work of art. But
there was one respect in which each failed. Neither discussed on principle
why its basic theory of the case, rather than that of the other, should
apply. What I wanted to know, and for me it was the controlling issue,
was why the rule of evidence rather than the privilege, or vice Uersa,
should be applied in and should control this case. But the arguments
largely skipped this question, namely, what considerations dictate that
this body of law rather than that one be applied. And because the
authorities most controlling were so approximate the pending case on
both sides, and so directly contradictory in analogy as to the outcome,
this was almost wholly a question of principle, perhaps somewhat of
history, as distinguished from one of authority merely.
So much for analysis. though possibly one thing more should be
added. If your case should present several issues regarded as important,
it aids when you indicate which you think are the more important.
Again, this is a matter of emphasis for the brief.
The Argument
I turn now to the third function, the application of the law-in
other words, your argument proper. Given the facts, given right and
true analysis, two functions remain, argument on principle and argu-
ment on authority.
Having been so long a teacher, I suppose I have a predilection for
principle, though that does not imply a contempt for authority.
But I find enlightenment in the former respect absent more fre-
quently than in the latter. Perhaps my major criticism of briefs, apart
from that relating to analysis, would deal with the lack of discussion
on principle. Some cases are so clearly ruled by authority, directly in
point and controlling, that discussion of principle is superfluous. But
these are not many. I have been surprised to find how many appealed
cases present issues not directly or exactly ruled by precedent. That is
as it should be. The novel case is the one most appropriate for appeal,
and the bar, on the whole, appears to exercise excellent discrimination
in selecting such cases for appeal. I.n a large percentage of the cases,
therefore, there is room for discussion and thought as well as for ci-
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lation. Discussion on principle has direct relation to analysis of facts.
If that is clearly and fully made, the former will follow almost auto-
matically. What we want to know is why this case, or line of cases,
should apply to these facts rather than that other line on which your
opponent relies with equal certitude, if not certainly. Too often the
why is left out. The discussion stops with the assertion that this case
or line of cases rules the present one. Assertion is not demonstration.
And beyond the amount necessary for statement of position and em-
phasis it may weaken or indicate that you are doubtful of your position.
"The lady doth protest too much." The argument which stops at
this point gives us the lead you wish us to follow. But it is bobtailed,
nevertheless. The lead may be the wrong one, or we may think it such.
Your reasons for thinking it the right one may keep us out of error, if
percliance we can be saved. In a close case, where the authorities pertinent
by. analogy are conflicting and especially when they are equally pertinent
and numerous on both sides, the discussion of the underlying principles
as related to the present application counts heavily to swing the scales.
In this connection, I shall have a suggestion to make later, concerning
the use of legal periodicals.
Finally, I come to the authoritative function. I shall state this
as briefly as possible.
1. When available the cases in point-on all fours-are the ones
we want. If they are available, your way, and in quantity to settle the
law,5 citation and discussion of others wastes your time and ours.
There is one ekception. That is when the law is settled the wrong
way and you think you can play legal Don Quixote successfully. This
has become a legal sport more popular in recent than in former years.
But it is still a mountain-climbing sport and when one tries to climb
perhaps anything goes, principle, law review articles, Brandeis briefs,
whatnot. The climb is not recommended for everyday exercise.
2. When the case is not ruled by precedent, then precedent by
analogy must take over the functions of persuasion and decision. And
this is where much waste occurs. The cases most approximate are the
ones we need. But approximation is always a matter of judgment and
degree. It is the old question of "when is far too far?" When using
cases by analogy (as well as otherwise) and relying heavily upon them,
it is always wise to give, in your own words, a brief and accurate state-
ment of the facts. Half or more of the meaning of the case you discuss
is lost, unless you do this-or unless your opponent has done it sufficient-
ly for you.
"There is not time for digression to discuss pet theories of stare decis.'s. But one
decision doesn't always give set to the law. Perhaps it seldom does. It was nearly fifty
years before the law as to the scope of interstate commerce -and Congress' power over
it assumed sufficient stability to be reliable as precedent in matters of federal power to
regulate business activities, particularly in manufacturing.
For instance, if your case is a civil one, involving a question of
paternity, and an issue is the use and admissibility of blood tests, citation
of criminal cases excluding such tests without showing that they are
criminal cases will not aid you. We will find it out. And when we do
your argument may be weakened more by the discovery than if you had
made it for us in the first place. We become, I think quite naturally,
more critical of all the authorities you cite. Blood tests may be one
thing in a bastardy proceeding, another in a civil suit for damages for
drunken driving, and still another for criminal prosecution for the latter.
It makes the brief clear to know which is involved when it discusses
some case in order to rely upon it.
3. Referring again to what I have said about discussing prin-
ciple, and recalling also the shots I have taken at law teachers and law
reviews, I suggest now quite seriously the more frequent and general
citation of law review materials. By this I mean the notes and com-
ments as well as the leading articles. I am not unconscious of the rumor
which I heard shortly after coming on the court that the Court of Ap-
peals had six copies of the Harvard Law Review and one copy of the
Code of the District of Columbia. The slander is false. We have two
copies of the Code.
But back from the Code to the law reviews. When material perti-
nent to your problem can be found, and it will seldom be lacking now,
the legal periodicals have several distinct advantages, and I mean for
citation in the brief for the purpose of winning on appeal.
First, if a leading article or a good note or comment is in point
on your case, or on an issue it presents, it will cite more pertinent cases
than the average busy lawyer is likely to find through the digest or
Corpus Juris. Its strictly authoritative value is first-rate. But this pre-
supposes you cite periodical material with the same discrimination you
do cases; in other words, it is the articles in print, or closely so, which
are helpful. For your assistance in locating them, the Index to Legal
Periodicals is available.
Again, an article or comment in point does something more than
any single case can do. A case is an incident in the history of a principle
or principles. It indicates, but it does not define or comprehend a trend.
It is merely a link in a chain. A good article gives one, in addition to
good citations, the history of an idea, the background of an institution,
the evolution of a principle, and lines of discrimination for its appli-
cation. In a recent case in which case authority was scarce, and involv-
ing difficult questions of administrative law and procedure, I found
more help in about three law review articles than in all the case law
and the statutes. They gave me the legislative history of the agency
and the administrative history of its functioning. These I could not
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have secured from the strictly authoritative materials. Nor could I
have secured them otherwise than as I did without weeks of investi-
gation which I did not have to give to it and perhaps would not have
felt free to make had time been available.
Finally, though other advantages might be mentioned, law re-
view materials, especially leading articles and notes, give superior analysis
of problems and discussions of their legal disposition on principle. The
"1'professor" still gets the raspberry. Too often still it is more rasp than
berry. The "college boy" editor or author still supplies sport for the
practical man of the law. But the professor is by way of becoming re-
spectable in law, somewhat as his European colleagues were before
academic freedom, and with it the great influence of the universities,
disappeared from the continent. And, regardless of whose "hot dogs"
they may be, the college-boy lawyers are showing, and show us every
day' briefs and oral arguments as able as any we read and hear. Preju-
diced as I may be in their favor, I commend their product for your
favorable consideration and use. It will help you win cases if you learn,
first to respect and then how to 'use it.
Miscellaneous Suggestions
I have a few "do's" and a few "don'ts" further to mention in clos-
ing which may assist you to see something of the judge's point of view.
1. Be brief, that is, concise-but not too brief. By this I mean be
as brief as you can consistently with adequate and clear presentation of
your cause.
2. Be candid. That applies to both facts and law. Nothing,
perhaps, so detracts-from the force and persuasiveness of an argument
as for the lawyer to claim more than he is reasonably entitled to claim.
Do not "stretch" cases you cite and rely upon too far, making them
appear to cover something to your benefit they do not cover. Do not
try to dodge or minimize unduly the facts which are against you. If
you can't win without doing this-and it is seldom you can by doing
it-your case should not be appealed. It is equally bad to give evasive
answers to questions at oral argument. Conversely, few things add
strength to an argument as does candid and full admission, whether as
to facts or law, of the factors which are clearly against one. When this
is made, we know that the lawyer is worthy of full confidence, and
every sentence he utters or writes carries force from the very fact that
he makes it.
3. It helps to break the monotony of the printed legal page to
add a bit of life to it now and then. I do not refer merely to the facts of
life like those in Spencer v. United States. Recently a brief characterized
an opponent's argument as "splitting a legal hair the wrong way." That
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gave me a kick for a day. Now and then there is a bit of unconscious
humor. Recently this appeared, quite seriously, in a patent brief:
"All the prior inventors who worked on [this problem]
missed this important solution discovered by appellant. If one
or two or a few inventors had missed the solution, that would
not be convincing, but when hundreds of inventors missed the
solution and when, in fact, all the inventors prior to appellant
missed the solution, it would certainly seem unfair and unjust to
penalize appellant for discovering the solution by denying him a
patent."
In the same brief the absence of a fan (used in the prior art.) from
appellant's mechanism was emphasized by the Patent Office. To this his
lawyer replied:
"No patent is ever granted for not doing something. A man
to secure a patent must set out how the result he is attempting to get
is secured. He is not supposed to set out how it is not secured. As
to telling the public how they cannot secure the result of the in-
ventor, [that] does not benefit the public. The law contemplates
that the public * * * shall know what shotild be done to secure the
beneficial result of the applicant's invention and not to know what
they should not do to secure it. This is plain common sense and, it
is thought, requires no citation." (Italics supplied.)
That one helped for a week. I do not recommend that you sup-
ply this brand of "life" in the brief, but it will be accepted with thanks
if the other cannot be supplied.
Now for a few "don'ts," some already touched upon.
First, as to quotations from prior opinions. I almost said, "don't."
But that would be going too far. Generally, omit the long ones. We,
too, can read the opinions, particularly if they are cited. And, again
generally speaking, leave out the abstract ones. By that I mean quota-
tions from opinions usually are meaningless, or nearly so, unless ac-
companied by thumbnail sketches of the important facts of the case.
Meaning then becomes concrete and definite. "Thumbnailing" is an art.
Again, avoid overstatement and repetition, except for the proper
uses of emphasis. Frequently we are able to understand the statement
after the third reiteration, that is, if it is understandable.
Finally, avoid as much as possible stilted legal language, the "there-
ins," "thereofs," "whereinbefores," "hereinafters," and what-have-
you's. Use English wherever you can express the idea as well and as
concisely as in law. A healthy respect for the robust Ango-Saxon ap-
peals to me more than does the Latin, whether or not it is Anglicized.
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The home-grown product in this case is better than the imported one.
But law has its vocabulary and that has its proper uses. Technical legal
terms and phrases often shorthand ideas otherwise to be stated only
with circumlocution and loss of meaning. Then one should "talk like
a lawyer." But the abuse comes when good, simple English will do
the work of the term of art just as well. The readability- of Holmes
and Cardozo is due, in part, to their mastery of the native tongue and
subjugation of the acquired language of the law.
In closing, I should say that the real way to talk profitably about
briefs would be to exemplify them. The brief, and its merit, are always
relative to the particular case. Cases, and therefore briefs, are as varied
as the subject matter and the lawyers who try cases and write the briefs.
But exemplification being not practical under the circumstances, I have
given you general observations, each of which should be qualified in
relation to particular applications as your sound judgment dictates.
After all, you write the briefs. On the whole, you do an excellent job.
It is the rare brief that leaves us uninformed, confused (more than be-
fore we read it), or irritated. Happily, the general effect is one which
makes us proud to be members of the profession, though now some-
what apart from its most active life. Through you as lenses we see the
causes of your clients. If we fail to see them truly, more often than not
it is our vision, not the lens, which is defective. But in unison, vision
and lens reflect the picture of the life they serve and, may we hope, guard
to some extent from the dangers which sweep over and throughout a
storm-tossed world. That the service may be done in justice requires
that it be done, by each of us, in humility. Without that, no man can
rightly be judge, or counsel, in another's cause. For you, too, are
judges of the people, without whom few causes would come to us for
decision in such form that their rights and liberties would be vindicated
and protected.
The New District Court Rules Now Available
The new rules for the Denver District Court which were adopted
by the judges of the court on February 7, 1942, have been printed, and
an ample supply of the rules are now on hand. The clerk, Major J. B.-
Goodman, Jr., states that attorneys may procure as many copies as are
desired by calling for them at his office.
